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Abstract
In this article, we present a brief narration of the origin and the
overview of the recent developments done on theKolkata Paise Restau-
rant (KPR) problem, which can serve as a prototype for a broader
class of resource allocation problems in the presence of a large num-
ber of competing agents, typically studied using coordination and anti-
coordination games. We discuss the KPR and its several extensions,
as well as its applications in many economic and social phenomena.
We end the article with some discussions on our ongoing experimen-
tal analysis of the same problem. We demonstrate that this provides
an interesting picture of how people analyze complex situations, and
design their strategies or react to them.
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1 Introduction
Chakrabarti et al. [1, 2] introduced the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem
(KPR henceforth), which was a multi-agent, multi-choice game. The origi-
nal motivation of the problem was to introduce the statistical analysis of a
large-scale coordination game. The game theoretic solution concepts were
introduced and it was shown that the agents (bots) could attain surprising
level of coordination using some simple heuristics, even without any global
coordinator. This approach was parallel to the one followed by Brian Arthur
in his famous paper on El Farol bar problem (EFB henceforth) [3], which
later gave birth to the minority game (MG henceforth) formulated by the
physicists [4].
The essential idea of Arthur was to show that heuristics based on induc-
tion, can be very useful for solving a game theoretic scenario. The KPR
problem can be viewed as simply a straight-forward generalization of the
EFB problem, yet mathematically tractable. However, as we would mention
in this paper, notwithstanding the huge amount of research done on the MG
problem [5], KPR provides a bigger laboratory to study many “complex”
emergent phenomena. In recent times, it has been also used for operations
research problems, which have enormous practical applications. For exam-
ple, the taxi services (like Uber and Ola) solve a bilateral matching problem
and KPR provides a starting point for analyzing such games [6]. For the
sake of completeness, we state only two versions of the KPR problem here,
though there are good resources for a much more complete description and
discussion. Interested readers can refer to Ref. [7, 8] and [9].
We can define two versions of the KPR, one without ranking and the
second with ranking. The first one is simpler and closer to a standard (anti-)
coordination game, and so we begin with the one without ranking.
Game 1 Consider a set of n players and a set of m identical restaurants
(n = m is the most interesting case). Each player has access to its own
set of information, which can be null (in principle), and has to secure
access to one restaurant (win). Each of the players has to decide which
restaurant to go, and if more than one player arrives at any restaurant,
then only one of them is chosen randomly with equal probability.
Game 2 Identical to the above, except that the restaurants are now ranked,
which is commonly agreed upon and known to all the players.
2
For the first game (and with the symmetric case, n = m), the Nash
equilibrium could be simply achieved by assigning each of the agents to one
restaurant only, such that all m restaurants are allocated and there are n
winners. In the second case, it is certainly more complicated – imagine all
the n agents being assigned to the m restaurants one-to-one, and solving
the KPR problem. Since the restaurants are now ranked, there would be
incentives for the person being assigned to lower rank restaurants to then
deviate and choose upper ranked restaurants. This type of cases have been
considered in details [9], and Chakrabarti et al. [1] provides conditions under
which there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria. Below, we briefly discuss the
different facets of the KPR.
2 KPR at the Crossroads of Disciplines
There exists significant amount of research done on coordination problems
in multiple disciplines. Computer scientists have worked on parallel pro-
cessing of jobs and tried to solve allocation problems by generating efficient
algorithms. Statistical physics literature has dealt with traffic models, which
again relate to individual choices leading to congestion and hence inefficiency.
Obviously, from a game theoretic perspective, the apparently different sce-
nario can be understood essentially as one congestion game. There are many
other possible applications and interpretations of the game. Hence, we con-
sider the KPR problem to represent a paradigm rather than a single, specific
problem. In the following, we describe some directions the KPR problem has
been studied and the links with existing literature across disciplines.
2.1 Heuristics to Solve a Complex Coordination Prob-
lem
A major part of the research on KPR has been to model it as a complex
coordination problem and show two things: Firstly, simple and local heuris-
tics can be useful for solving global optimization problem. Secondly, it can
provide insights into how effective the different heuristics are to solve the
problem. Imagine that this is a resource competition game and each success-
ful match leads to reproductive success. Then the strategy pool would start
evolving favoring more successful strategies. Chakrabarti and Ghosh (see
Refs. [10] and [11]) considered a sequence of heuristics and also introduced
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limited form of learning and analyzed the relative successes. It turned out
that simple rules of reinforcement learning with little use of any global or
local information of the agents, could actually solve the allocation problem
with very high efficiency.
2.2 Attaining Distributed Coordination
An important problem in designing efficient solvers is to find a way to dis-
tribute the load across different processors to attain parallel processing. One
way to think about it, is to consider a central coordinator that would assign
tasks across processors. However, in a multi-agent system with a very large
number of agents, it may be prohibitively expensive to program such task
(or resource) allocation a priori for all possible contingencies. Therefore, we
may like to have intelligent agents who can strategize and discover the way
to divide tasks by themselves.
Cigler and Faltings [12] considered this approach and suggested that a
correlated equilibrium (proposed in the game theory literature by Aumann)
could solve this problem; but they also recognized that such a device (which
induces anti-coordination) basically acts as the central coordinator, and so
this idea did not prove to be very useful. So they further proposed some
learning rules, which are useful for solving this kind of problems. Hansen
and Giauque [13] proposed dynamic programming algorithm as an alternate
for task allocation problems. There are many other papers, which addressed
similar questions (see for example, Refs. [14], [15], [16]).
2.3 Connections to Game Theory
The KPR is essentially a game theoretic problem, and so it is least surpris-
ing that economists would be interested in a similar paradigm. The original
formulation of the KPR problem assumed that not only the agents have a
ranking over the restaurants, but also the ranking is identically agreed upon
and known to all agents. More explicitly, each and every agent agrees on
which one is the better restaurant in any given pair of restaurants. A more
complex version of the same problem was already known as the Stable Mar-
riage Problem, where one assumed that there were two groups of members
(identical in number), say men and women, who would marry each other1.
1Same-sex marriage is not considered in the present context.
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Each man had a ranking of the women, and vice versa. The problem was to
find the matches across members of the two groups such that there would be
no two members who would rather break up and marry each other.
Gale and Shapley in 1962 provided an algorithm to solve this problem
[17]. This problem has related variants like assignment problem, where a
number of agents have to be matched with the same number of tasks such
that the matching is one-to-one. The catch is that every match has a cost
of implementation and so the problem is to minimize the total cost of all
matches. Such problems are of immense importance from a practical point
of view. Roth and Pernson [18] provided a detailed algorithm along with
applications for solving such allocation problems.
It is clear that although KPR deals with an allocation problem, there
exist significant differences with respect to the above-mentioned approaches.
One of the crucial differences is that in the above problems, it is assumed
that there exists a central coordinator who allocates the task, whereas in
KPR there exists none. So, we now move from the discussion on a central
planner to a decentralized outcome.
From the game theoretic perspective, an important class of games known
as congestion games, are close to the KPR problem. This class of games also
assumes that players can choose any one among multiple options (roads) and
if the same option is chosen by more than one player (leading to congestion)
then that is bad for all of them. This can be mapped to the KPR problem
(without ranking) upon simplification.
The closest problem was stated by Grenager et al. [19], as well as Alpern
and Reyniers [20] who called it dispersion game. However, KPR with ranking
has a more general structure. Below, we discuss the connection of the KPR
with agent-based modelling literature and in particular, with the minority
game literature.
2.4 Agent-based Models and Connections to MG
A variant of the EFB problem was proposed and analyzed by Challet and
Zhang, which later on gained considerable popularity as the minority game
(MG) [4,21–25]. Structure-wise, MG is a N -agents, 2-choice repeated game.
Choices are defined over two restaurants are considered and the agents on
the less-crowded side are considered to be the winners while the rest of them
are declared losers. The primary aim of introducing the MG was to serve as
simple a model of a financial market. Two choices are identified as ‘buy’ or
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‘sell’ options executed by the trades. More buyers than sellers in any day
would imply gain (positive payoff) for sellers and the opposite when there
were more sellers than buyers. The total payoff of all agents could be treated
as equivalent to the excess demand of the market, and be considered as the
price return (directly proportional to the excess demand) of the market [21].
Traders would learn from their own history of the game and alter their
optimization strategy as the need be. The fluctuations of the players using
different strategies in the steady state reflects the inherently dynamical and
adaptive nature of the game. Agent-based modeling and Monte Carlo simu-
lations, along with tools borrowed from statistical physics were used to show
that the variability of fluctuation can be minimized in terms of memory size
and number of players.
Physicists and economists became interested in related problems like the
crowd versus anti-crowd movement of agents, broadly in the context of opin-
ion formation. MG has served as prototype model for evolving and adaptive
systems. Sysi-Aho et al. [26–29], in a sequence of papers, studied a modified
version of the MG where the players were able to choose newer strategies
using mechanisms of genetic crossover depending on their relative perfor-
mances. This modification was useful to make the agent-based models appli-
cable to many real-world systems especially with heterogeneous agents and
non-linear interactions.
3 Could laboratory experiments provide new
insight?
Numerous laboratory experiments have tested whether or not human agents
play Nash equilibrium strategies in various different games, both one-shot and
sequential. Some one-shot games with unique pure strategy Nash equilibria
that have been tested in the laboratory include the prisoners’ dilemma [30,
31], voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) games [32]2, auctions [35],
Bertrand pricing game [36] and the travelers’ dilemma [37]. A few sequential
games, including the ultimatum bargaining game [38,39] and the trust game
[40], have been studied in the laboratory. The results from these studies
broadly establish that human players are not as hyper-rational as predicted
2See Refs. [33] and [34] for meta-analyses of prisoners’ dilemma and linear public goods
games, respectively.
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by theory, and the laboratory outcome is often not the Nash equilibrium3. In
almost all studies, bounded rationality as well as concerns for equality, affect
human decision-making. Stahl and Wilson [42] introduced level-k rationality
model that attempts to model different levels of rationality that a human
player in a one-shot game may display. Models of other-regarding preferences
that have been informed by results from laboratory experiments include those
by Rabin [43], Fehr and Schmidt [44], and Bolton and Ockenfels [45].
The class of games that is particularly relevant for our study is coordi-
nation games. These are modeled in their normal form as one shot games
with multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto rankable [46] or non-Pareto
rankable [47, 48]. In such games, an empirical question that interests game
theorists and experimental economists is whether agents manage to play the
coordination outcome that realizes for them the highest level of joint profit,
i.e., the welfare maximizing or efficient outcome. Given that a refinement
is necessary to identify the more likely ones from this set of multiple equi-
libria, game theorists and experimentalists have developed possible selection
criteria of equilibria and tested their empirical validity. Broadly speaking,
the selection criteria that have been suggested either rely on structural prop-
erties of games or salience in the form of naturally occurring psychological
labels. An important criterion relying on the structural properties of games
involves the ideas of payoff and risk dominance was introduced by Harsanyi
and Selten [49]. The theory of hierarchical decision-making that relies on
the existence of focal points was first posited by Schelling [47] and tested by
Mehta et al. [48]. Accordingly, naturally occurring labels that are of com-
mon knowledge can allow for greater coordination, particularly, in situations
where there exist many non-Pareto rankable Nash equilibria.
Important experimental studies of coordination games with multiple Pareto
ranked Nash equilibria includes the work of Van Huyck et al. [50], who study
the minimum effort coordination game with seven Pareto rankable Nash equi-
libria with 14 to 16 subjects. They find on static repetition that subjects
initially attempt to coordinate on the payoff dominant Nash equilibria but
within a few periods only manage to converge to the risk dominant equilib-
rium. Cooper et al. [51] use a much simpler two player three strategy design,
and in a similar fashion find that contrary to what Harsanyi and Selten [49]
argue. Pareto dominance does not prove to be a robust predictor for equi-
librium selection and dominated strategies are often not decision-irrelevant.
3See Ref. [41] for a meta-analysis of trust game experiments.
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Straub [52] reaches a conclusion similar to Cooper et al. [51] by using simple
two by two coordination games.
Strong path dependence is seen in another work by Huyck et al. [53]
in a median-action “continental divide” game, where there are two Pareto
ranked equilibria. If in the initial rounds of a finitely repeated game session,
participants are close to the high payoff equilibrium, then they tend to remain
close to this equilibrium over all the rounds. A similar pattern is seen for
sessions where choices remain close to the lower payoff equilibrium for the
whole session. This history dependence in statically repeated one-shot games
opens up the possibility for applying lagged behavioural models such as the
reinforcement learning model [54] and the Experience Weighted Attraction
(EWA) model [55].
An important goal of our KPR experiment [56] is to test the various
strategies that are employed by incentivized human subjects in the complex
situation where a solution cannot be deduced. There are a number of points
that we would like to see: (i) Whether or not these strategies move the
cohort of players closer to the efficient outcome; (ii) If there is any effect of
experience and information feedback on coordination to the efficient outcome;
(iii) The usage of learning models in order to model the decisions taken in the
experiment, and (iv) The effect of external mechanisms that can potentially
increase coordination efficiency and lead to better utilization.
In the experimental data collected so far, we do not see a significant
effect of information and experience in increasing the utilization ratio. In
our experiment, we broadly observe a few behavioral types: (a) the noise
traders – who are reactive and change their choices very frequently, (b) the
completely stable agents – who stick to one strategy over all the periods, and
(c) the intermediate type – who change their strategies a few times over the
experiment, though not as much as the agents in case (a). We also check
whether changes in strategy are influenced by the outcome in the previous
period and find that going from failure to success in the previous period
significantly lowers the likelihood of a player changing his or her strategy in
the current period. The results do not exactly match with similar simulation
studies that were conducted before, and hence provide new insights. We do
need to conduct more such experiments and understand how human beings
actually strategize and adapt in “complex” situations.
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4 Summary and Outlook
The KPR serves as a prototype model describing a general problem of com-
petition over finite resources in a large population with a fully decentralized
decision process, i.e., without any communication between the competitors.
The repeated interactions and the associated learning mechanism lead to
emergence of collective dynamics in the form of fluctuations in resource uti-
lization. Additionally, in this competitive framework, the agents choose ot
be in the minority. Hence, they need to act as differently as possible through
adaptation and modification of strategies, which would entail heterogeneous
and non-equilibrium dynamics such as those found in many complex systems.
As described above, the KPR encapsulates multiple facets of complexity the-
ory and connects multiple disciplines. We hope that in the near future, this
game will serve as a cornerstone for studying global optimization problem
from localized active smart agents, in both theory and experiment.
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